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Supplier Tactics for Dealing with Financially
Distressed Corporate Customers
John A. Pearce II* and Ilya A. Lipin**
I. THE SUPPLIERS’ FINANCIAL PREDICAMENT
When a corporation declares bankruptcy, its suppliers often suffer
severe economic losses. These losses result when the bankrupt firm: (1)
fails to honor its contractual obligations to its supplier,1 (2) gains
permission to modify its contract with its supplier,2 (3) refuses to pay its
supplier, (4) rejects its supplier’s request for reclamation of goods, (5)
forces the supplier to finance the bankruptcy restructuring,3 (6) repudiates a
prepayment plan to a supplier,4 or (7) enforces a supplier’s obligations
under the contract during the bankruptcy.
In all of these situations, the profitability of a supplier suffers when
accounts receivable become uncollectible or when goods become
unrecoverable due to a customer’s bankruptcy.5
* John A. Pearce II, Ph.D., is the VSB Endowed Chair in Strategic Management and
Entrepreneurship and Professor of Management, Villanova School of Business, Villanova University.
Pennsylvania State University, Ph.D.; University of Pittsburgh, M.B.A.; Ohio University, B.B.A. Dr.
Pearce specializes in strategic planning and legal issues in business. john.pearce@villanova.edu.
** Ilya A. Lipin, J.D., LL.M., MBA is a licensed practicing attorney in Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and Massachusetts. Mr. Lipin received his LL.M. in Trial Advocacy from Temple University School of
Law, M.B.A. from Villanova School of Business in 2010, LL.M. in Taxation from Villanova School of
Law in 2008, J.D. from Thomas M. Cooley Law School in 2006, and B.A. from Drew University in
2003. Mr. Lipin may be reached at ilya.a.lipin@gmail.com.
1. Union Hopes to Prevent Comair From Breaking Contract With Flight Attendants, AIRLINE
INDUS. INFO. 1 Mar. 9, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0CWU/is_2006_
March_9/ ai_n16101923/?tag=content;col1.
2. Sarah O’Connor, Anousha Sakoui & Daniel Thomas, Shoe Chains Give Vote to Creditors, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2009) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b10c5632-ec11-11dd-8838-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz
1mckbhRyg.
3. Aleris Tops Creditors in Court, BANK LOAN REP. Mar. 23, 2009, available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-196137850.html.
4. Marty Orgel, Not worth the plastic they are printed on, MARKETWATCH.COM (Mar. 3, 2008),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bankruptcies-often-leave-consumers-holding-worthless-gift-cards.
5. See Kristian Park, The Monitoring of Supply Chain Risk Should Increase Across the Corporate
Radar, ALLBUSINESS.COM, May 2011, at 26, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/companyactivities-management/operations-quality-control/15725501-1.html (stating that “[t]hroughout the
recession many companies believed the biggest threat to their supply chains to be the potential
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The recession that began in December 2007 led to thousands of
corporate bankruptcies. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, there were 43,546 bankruptcy filings involving business debts in
2008, a fifty-four percent increase over 2007.6 The filings from July 1,
2008, through June 30, 2009, show 55,021 business bankruptcies, which is
a sixty-three percent increase over the prior year.7 Boscov’s, Linens-nThings, Eddie Bauer, Sharper Image, Steve & Barry’s, KB Toys, Circuit
City, and Bombay Co. are just few of the well-known businesses that filed
for bankruptcy protection in the first nineteen months of the recession.
The bankruptcy of suppliers following the financial failures of large
corporations is exemplified by the United States automobile manufacturing
industry. In the first nine month of 2009 alone, there were forty-seven
bankruptcy filings of principal suppliers to the automobile industry, after
the bankruptcies of General Motors and Chrysler,8 and the financial
difficulties of Ford Motor.9 The largest of these companies, all with recent
annual revenues in excess of $1 billion, are Lear, Visteon, Smurfit-Stone
Container, Cooper-Standard Holdings, Hayes Lemmerz, Metaldyne, and
Mark IV Dayco Products.10
The damaging effects of the 2007-2009 recession lingered into late
201111 and business bankruptcy rates continued to rise. From July 1, 2009,
through June 30, 2010, there were 59,608 business bankruptcy filings, an
increase of 8.3% from the prior year.12 Failures to meet corporate
obligations are predicted to rise by 2014,13 setting off a new wave of

insolvency of a third party business partner”).
6. U.S. Courts Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/Bankruptcystatistics.aspx
(last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
7. Id.
8. See Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J., Jun.
2, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124385428627671889.html (approximating
that the bailout of GM and Chrysler LLC cost the taxpayers more than $62 billion).
9. See Restoring Credit to Manufacturers: Testimony of the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers
Association Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Economic Policy
Subcomm., 110th Cong. 1 (2009), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction
=Files.View&FileStore_id=e4610997-7941-4358-8b4b-1b4c89c7e42c.
10. See BILL CANIS & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RES. SERVICE, R41151, THE U.S. MOTOR
VEHICLE INDUSTRY: CONFRONTING A NEW DYNAMIC IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41154.pdf (stating that “[i]t is estimated that as many as 200 other
suppliers liquidated their operations in 2009”).
11. Motoko Rich, Feeble Job Numbers Show Recovery Starting to Stall, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2011,
at A1 (referencing economic data and stating that “economic recovery is stumbling”). See also Dan
Shingler, Manufacturers Still Skeptical, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS., Jan. 18, 2010, at 1 (referencing
fears of double dip recession and its effect on suppliers).
12. See U.S. Courts Bankruptcy Statistics, supra note 6.
13. See Michael J. de la Merced, A Forecast of a Lower Rate for Defaults, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2011, at B10 (noting predictions that corporate default rates will rise by 2014).
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financial pressures on suppliers and their business customers. Thus,
suppliers will benefit from being proactive in their use of legal tools to
increase the probability of collecting receivables from their customers.14
After a company declares bankruptcy, its suppliers are forced into the
position of trying to recover payments that are legally owed to them. For
example, in November of 2008, Circuit City filed for bankruptcy
protection. The bankruptcy documents show that Circuit City owed $650
million to suppliers, with electronics manufacturers Sony, Zenith, Toshiba,
Garmin, and Nikon among the creditors.15 Circuit City also owed $119
million to Hewlett-Packard, and $116 million to Samsung Electronics.16
When bankruptcy causes liquidation of the company, creditors usually
recover only a portion of the original amount owed to them, if anything.
For instance, in KB Toys 2008 bankruptcy, unsecured creditors expected to
receive less than $0.10 on the dollar of what they were owed
contractually.17 In the 2009 liquidation of Copia, the liquidation plan
provided unsecured creditors with only $0.13 on the dollar and secured
creditors, such as bondholders, only received partial recovery proceeds.18
Similarly, Chrysler’s 2009 bankruptcy was financially devastating for the
bondholders who were owed $6.9 billion by the carmaker, but collected
only $0.29 on the dollar under the Chapter 11 agreement.19
Such large corporate failures can lead to hundreds of tier-2 supplier
bankruptcies.20 Financial problems of large automotive companies had a

14. See Melinda Vajdic, A Shrinking Supply Chain, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUS., Dec. 6, 2010, at 22
(suggesting suppliers begin “honing [in] strategies to become flexible and innovative enough to deal
with whatever their mega-clients dish out next”).
15. Mark Clothier & Dawn McCarty, Circuit City, Electronics Retailer, Seeks Bankruptcy,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aXeltuiAOyzs&pid=2060
1087.
16. Id.
17. Peg Brickley, KB Toys Faces Liquidation, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB122901585422798605.html.
18. Steve Hart, Judge to Review Objections to Copia Liquidation, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Aug. 14,
2009, available at http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20090814/business/908149919?Title=Judgeto-review-objections-to-Copia-liquidation. Copia is also known as the American Center for Wine, Food
and the Arts.
19. Marie Leone, How Chrysler Spruced Up Bankruptcy, CFO.COM (Aug. 7, 2009),
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14201952/c_14200417.
20. Direct suppliers of parts to an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) are tier-1 suppliers.
Suppliers that provide parts or components to tier-1 suppliers, to combine, repackage, or to simply
forward to OEMs, are tier-2 suppliers. See Leigh Lones, Increasing Liquidity in the Automotive Supply
Chain, COMM. FACTOR, 10, (Spring 2011) (stating that “Tier One suppliers provide full design,
assembly and engineering support. They sell finished components, such as transmissions, seats and
instrument panels, directly to car companies, known in the industry as Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs). Tier One is comprised mostly of large companies such as Delphi or Johnson
Controls. Tier Two companies mostly sell products to Tier One. An example of a typical Tier Two
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devastating impact on their suppliers, and on their second tier suppliers.21
For instance, Visteon, a former division of Ford, was one of the largest auto
suppliers that filed for bankruptcy protection after the production cutbacks
by Chrysler and General Motors eroded its financial stability.22 Visteon
stated that its failure would have a ripple effect and put a financial strain on
many of its suppliers.23
Unable to collect from automotive companies such as General Motors,
many suppliers nearly have burned through their cash reserves.24 Banks are
retreating from auto-industry lending and private lenders are refusing to
increase credit for many shaky parts makers due to risks.25 The Obama
administration responded by establishing a $5-billion fund to assist
struggling automotive suppliers through the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(“TARP”). The terms of the program stated the General Motors was to
receive $2 billion and Chrysler $1.5 billion.26 Further, each company had
to contribute an amount equal to five percent of their receipts and if
necessary could access the remaining $1.5 billion at a later date.27 The
benefit of the program was to guarantee that suppliers would be paid for
their deliveries without additional wait for payments, thus restoring the
flow of credit in a critical sector that employs more than 500,000 American
workers.28 However, the program was criticized because it permitted
General Motors and Chrysler to decide which suppliers would benefit from
the program and receive the payments. Thus, some suppliers may not
receive any payments from the program that was designed to help them.
As a result, very little of the set aside money benefited the industry’s
company would be one that supplies component parts, such as transmission gears, electronics,
speedometers and seat covers, to the Tier One suppliers. Tier Three suppliers generally provide smaller
components and some tooling and dies to Tier Two companies. In practice, they sell to both Tier One
and Tier Two.”).
21. Society of Automotive Analysts, SAA Analysts Warn of Increased Supplier, Bankruptcies,
Further Image Damage in Wake of Chrysler Bankruptcy, REUTERS (May 1, 2009), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2009/05/01/idUS152206+01-May-2009+PRN20090501.
22. Jeffrey McCracken & Andrew Grossman, Auto Supplier Visteon Plans Chapter 11 Filing in
U.S., WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at B1. At the end of 2008, Visteon employed 11,000 salaried workers
and 22,500 hourly workers world-wide. The company also had $893 million in unfunded pension
obligations.
23. Martha Graybow & Jessica Hall, Visteon Gets Bankruptcy Court OK to Pay Wages, REUTERS
(May 29, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE54S56W20090529.
24. Rick Barrett, For GM Suppliers, Struggles Remain, JOURNAL SENTINEL (July 10, 2009),
available at http://www.jsonline.com/business/50505737.html.
25. Jesse Snyder, Supplier Woes Will Worsen Before They Improve, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Aug. 3,
2009, at 12A.
26. Nick Bunkley, Aid Program for Suppliers Starts With $3.5 Billion in Loans to G.M. and
Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at B4.
27. Id.
28. Bunkley, supra note 26, at B4.
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suppliers.29
This article consists of seven parts. Part I provides an introduction
and explanation as to how customers’ financial distress and bankruptcy can
affect suppliers’ ability to obtain full payment for goods sold. Part II
describes how the Bankruptcy Code is relevant to suppliers and how
customers faced with an inability to pay their obligations as they become
due use it to gain an advantage over their suppliers. Part III offers an
extensive discussion of the supplier remedies under BAPCPA, such as
reclamation and administrative priority status, while Part IV details the
remedies available to suppliers under state law. Tactics that may improve
the leverage of the supplier when dealing with the financially distressed
customers are proposed in Part V. Part VI suggests innovative methods to
receive full payment from customers. Lastly, Part VII discusses unsettled
issues of importance to suppliers that remain after the enactment of
BAPCPA.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S RELEVANCE TO SUPPLIERS
The Bankruptcy Code provides for two types of bankruptcies that
most often have consequences for creditors, including suppliers: Chapter 7
and Chapter 11.30
A case under Chapter 7 is one of liquidation.31 The goal of Chapter 7
is to provide debtors with the opportunity for a “fresh start” by discharging
most of their debts, and to provide for the equitable distribution of debtor’s
non-exempt assets among the creditors, which include the suppliers. Since
the corporate debtor cannot receive a discharge under Chapter 7, the goal is
to provide for liquidation and distribution of debtor’s corporate assets to its
suppliers.32 In liquidation, the bankruptcy trustee administers the case,
liquidates all the nonexempt assets, and distributes the proceeds from the

29. Brian Albright, OEM Bankruptcies Hinder Parts Availability, AFTERMARKET BUS., Aug. 1,
2009, at 36.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (2006). (“The term ‘creditor’ means: (A) entity that has a claim against
the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor; (B) entity that
has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in § 348(d), § 502(f), § 502(g), § 502(h) or § 502(i) of
the bankruptcy code; or (C) entity that has a community claim.”). See id. § 101(13) (“The term
‘debtor’ means person or municipality concerning which a case under bankruptcy code has been
commenced.”). See id. § 101(15) (“The term ‘entity’ includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit,
and United States trustee.”).
31. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2006). See 2 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER
BANKRUPTCY MANUAL P 700.01 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed. rev. 2009) (stating that “[l]iquidation is a
form of relief afforded by the bankruptcy laws that involves the collection, liquidation and distribution
of the nonexempt property of the debtor and culminates in the discharge of the liquidation debtor”).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2006).
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liquidation in accordance with priority status of liens and bankruptcy law.
For suppliers at the bottom of the priority list this means receiving pennies
on the dollar. Filing of Chapter 7 also means stay of collection actions
against the debtor or debtor’s property.33 During the automatic stay, or
until it is lifted by the bankruptcy court, the suppliers may not initiate or
continue lawsuits to collect moneys due.
A case under Chapter 11 is one of reorganization and is primarily
focused on business debtors.34 The bankruptcy petition may be filed
voluntary by the debtor or forced on the firm by its creditors, which include
suppliers.35 Under Chapter 11, the debtor continues to operate its business
as a debtor in possession (“DIP”)36 and is placed in the position of a
fiduciary with rights and powers of the Chapter 11 trustee.37 The hallmark
of Chapter 11 is flexibility, where the DIP is offered a considerable
discretion in the operation of its business,38 in exchange for entering into a
contractual plan with suppliers regarding repayment of debt. Under the
plan, suppliers are compensated pursuant to the terms either negotiated
with other creditors or imposed by the court. The plan presents an
opportunity for restructuring the business with the goal to preserve jobs,
pay suppliers, and reduce the disturbance that can result from termination
of a business.39
The filing of a Chapter 11 case causes all of the debtor’s property to
become property of the bankruptcy estate.40 Again, after filing, the
automatic stay protects the debtor and debtor’s property from collections of
prepetition claims.41 This means that suppliers may not collect their prepetition dues from the DIP, unless they get the permission of the
bankruptcy court which may lift or modify the automatic stay.
In addition, filing under Chapter 11 provides DIP with various
powers. The DIP has the power to use, sell, or lease property of the

33. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). See id. § 362(b) for exceptions to automatic stay.
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (2006). See RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 1101.01.
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2006).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006). See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006), which allows the court to appoint a
trustee other than DIP.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006). See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(2)–(4) (2006) for exclusions and exceptions
relating to investigatory powers.
38. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 1100.01 (noting that “[t]he hallmark of chapter 11 is
flexibility. The debtor in possession is offered considerable discretion in the operation of the business,
constrained generally only by a business judgment rule”).
39. Id.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006). See 11 U.S.C § 541(b) (2006) for property excluded from the
definition.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
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estate,42 but is required to provide adequate protection to entities with
interests in the property.43 The DIP may obtain financing for post-petition
operations, which may include entering into new agreements where liens
will take priority over preexisting obligations.44 The DIP also has the
power to assume or reject contracts and leases.45 The rejection of an
executory contract leaves the supplier with various state law remedies,
which are hard to enforce against an insolvent buyer. If the trustee assumes
the contact, then the supplier will have to perform in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.46 For suppliers these Chapter 11 provisions mean
that the DIP may change or break their contracts, change the supplier’s prepetition priority status, continue to use supplier’s property throughout the
bankruptcy, and risk never being compensated for goods sold.
III. SUPPLIER REMEDIES UNDER BAPCPA
In October 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) was enacted to amend the Bankruptcy Code.
The BAPCPA provides additional remedies for the creditor-supplier under
sections 503(b)(9) and 546(c) that did not exist under the prior law. To
minimize the economic harm caused by customer’s bankruptcy, an unpaid
supplier must assert certain rights provided by the BAPCPA.
A. RECLAMATION
Reclamation is the right of a seller to recover possession of goods
delivered to an insolvent buyer.47 The BAPCPA has significantly extended
the reclamation period for goods that were shipped to a bankrupt debtor.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). See also RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 1100.01 (stating that
“[t]he debtor in possession is given the ability to use, sell, or lease property of the estate, even if the
property is subject to the interest of another entity, and even if this interest is a lien or security interest
which would follow proceeds under applicable nonbankruptcy law”).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2006).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006). See RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 34, at 1101.01 (noting that
“[t]he debtor in possession may also rationalize its business through the assumption or rejection of
executory contracts or leases; by assumption, the estate becomes fully liable for any pre-petition
contracts, and by rejection the estate breaches the contract and may treat the damages as arising
prepetition”).
46. In re R. F. Cunningham & Co., 2006 WL 3791329, at 3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006). The trustee
in this situation has to ensure that buyer performs in accordance with the contract by making the
required payments to the supplier. At the consummation of the deal, the supplier will remove itself from
the insolvency proceeding because the supplier obtained payments and is no longer affected by either
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Id.
47. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 414 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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Prior to BAPCPA, suppliers relied on the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”) for remedies pertaining to shipment of goods to a bankrupt
debtor. Suppliers specifically depended on section 2-702, which allowed
them to stop shipment or reclaim goods shipped within ten days of insolvency.48
Reclamation under BAPCPA’s section 546(c) does not preclude
supplier to pursue other nonbankruptcy remedies.49 Under section 546(c)
suppliers have forty-five days to reclaim goods that they have sold and
shipped in their ordinary course of business to a bankrupt debtor.50 The
reclamation demand must be made in writing within forty-five days of the
receipt of goods.51 However, if the forty-five day period has not expired as
of the filing of the bankruptcy case, the supplier will have an additional
twenty days to demand reclamation after the bankruptcy filing date.52 As a
result of section 546(c), a supplier now has the ability to reclaim goods up
to forty-five days’ worth of shipments, if not paid for and in the possession
of the debtor, in contrast to ten days’ worth.53 This section of BAPCPA is
particularly beneficial to suppliers who ship products that turn over at a

48. U.C.C. § 2-702 (West 2012).
49. The non-bankruptcy remedies may be subjected to the trustee’s avoidance powers and
automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). The seller may stop goods in transit. See In re Nat’l Sugar
Refining Co., 27 B.R. 565, 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that “[w]hen the buyer is insolvent and
thus impaired in fulfilling its contractual obligation to pay, the seller rather than deliver the goods and
seek to recover on the price . . . may withhold or stop in transit the delivery of the goods—i.e., suspend
his performance”); In re Fabric Buys, 34 B.R. 471, 475 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a “buyer’s
attempt to receive goods on credit while insolvent renders the sale voidable and triggers the seller’s
right to stop the goods in transit”); In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 740 F.2d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 1984)
(noting that the right to stop goods in transit is considered to be a “different right”); In re Mayer Pollack
Steel Corp., 157 B.R. 952, 960 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that “[c]aselaw precedents, as well as the
terms of 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(2), clearly indicate that the right to reclamation is not absolute. Thus,
where a seller’s right to reclamation is superseded by the superior rights of a secured creditor or where
the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser before the reclamation demand is received, the seller
may be awarded, at the court’s discretion, either an administrative claim or a lien.”).
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2006). This provision of the bankruptcy code states that: “(1) Except
as provided in subsection (d) of this section and in § 507(c), and subject to the prior rights of a holder of
a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof, the rights and powers of the trustee under §§
544(a), 545, 547, and 549 are subject to the right of a seller of goods that has sold goods to the debtor,
in the ordinary course of such seller’s business, to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such
goods while insolvent, within 45 days before the date of the commencement of a case under this title,
but such seller may not reclaim such goods unless such seller demands in writing reclamation of such
goods: (A) not later than 45 days after the date of receipt of such goods by the debtor; or (B) not later
than 20 days after the date of commencement of the case, if the 45-day period expires after the
commencement of the case. (2) If a seller of goods fails to provide notice in the manner described in
paragraph (1), the seller still may assert the rights contained in § 503(b)(9).” Id.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2006).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1)(B) (2006).
53. Lynne Xerras, BAPCPA Spells Relief For Certain Trade Creditors in Chapter 11, 7
BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS’ RIGHTS 2 (2006).
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slow rate.54
Suppliers must be aware of the law surrounding reclamation in
bankruptcy. A timely written demand must be made even if the debtor has
made misrepresentations regarding its solvency.55 This demand must be an
explicit desire to reclaim goods,56 and must be made by the seller and not
third parties.57 The condition and location of goods is also important. The
seller must identify the goods sought in debtor’s possession.58 Goods that
were converted into a finished product may not be reclaimed.59 Further,
reclamation does not apply to proceeds.60 Thus, if supplier’s widgets were
installed into a car of an insolvent automobile manufacturer, the supplier
does not have a reclamation rights as to the widgets installed or to the
proceeds.
1. In re Advanced Marketing Services Inc.
Under BAPCPA, the supplier’s legal right to reclamation of goods is
subject to floating and post-petition liens.61 The statutory language of
section 546(c) expressly makes reclamation rights “subject to the prior
rights of a holder of a security interest in the goods or the proceeds
thereof.”62

54. Xerras, supra note 53, at 2.
55. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 546.04. See Oakland Gin Co. v. Marlow (In re Julien
Co.), 44 F.3d 426, 432 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting the use of the demand); In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 740
F.2d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that “Section 546(c) unambiguously provides that the seller may
not reclaim goods from the trustee in bankruptcy unless he first “demands in writing reclamation of
such goods before ten days after receipt of such goods by the debtor”).
56. In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 740 F.2d 220, at 224. See In Re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp.
840, 844 (W.D. Va. 1968) (where the court held that simply demanding payment for goods did not
constitute a written demand for reclamation).
57. In re Julien Co., 44 F.3d 426, 432, n.4 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 546 “clearly states that the
‘seller’ must make the written demand, not a warehouseman or bailee of the seller”).
58. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 31, at 546.04 (stating that “[t]he seller must establish that the
goods to be reclaimed are in the debtor’s possession when reclamation was sought, and the goods must
be identifiable”).
59. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 74 B.R. 656, 658 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (noting that
“fungible goods may be reclaimed if the seller can trace the goods from its possession into an
identifiable mass that contains goods of like kind and grade”).
60. In re MGS Mktg., 111 B.R. 264, 267 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Cal. 1990).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2007). See In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores Inc., 302 B.R. 128, 134
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that “[w]hile, the right to reclamation is subordinate to that of a good
faith purchaser, it is not automatically extinguished”); Auto Auction Assocs. of Mont., Inc. v. Incredible
Auto Sales LLC (In re Incredible Auto Sales LLC), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26,
2007); In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 418 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2007). See Xerras, supra note 53, at 213 (noting that the “language
essentially eliminates any ability of a vendor to challenge that a lender is not a ‘good-faith’ purchaser as
that term is used in Article 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code such that the rights of an under-
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The provisions of section 546(c) were first interpreted in Advanced
Marketing Services Inc. (“AMS”) Chapter 11 case.63 The insolvent buyer,
AMS, was a wholesaler of general interest goods to membership warehouse
clubs, certain specialty retailers, e-commerce companies, traditional
bookstores and bookstore chains.64 Simon & Schuster, Inc. (“S&S”) was
one of the largest third-party publishers from whom AMS acquired books.65
The same day AMS filed for bankruptcy, S&S sent a reclamation
demand to AMS.66 Thereafter, S&S filed a complaint seeking to reclaim
approximately $5 million in goods67 and a motion for a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”).68
At the time of the TRO hearing,
approximately $800,000 of inventory subject to S&S’s reclamation claim
remained in AMS’s possession.69
S&S was trying to reclaim goods that were subject to both pre- and
post-petition liens established to the same lender.70 S&S was a party to prepetition Loan and Security Agreement entered into in 2004 (“Senior
Facility”), where Wells Fargo Foothill, Inc. (“Foothill”) was an agent for
the lenders (“Senior Lenders”).71 The Senior Facility was an asset-based
lending agreement, which provided for a revolving line of credit
(“Revolving Loans”) up to $90-million maximum commitment.72 AMS’s
obligations under the Senior Facility were secured by a floating lien on

secured lender to assert a lien in the goods sold by the vendor are superior”). See In re Reliable Drug
Stores, Inc., 70 F.3d 948, 950 (7th Cir. Ind. 1995) (noting that “[a] reclamation claim is ‘subject to’ the
interests of good faith purchasers”).
63. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Advanced Mktg. Servs. (In re Advanced Mktg. Servs.), 360 B.R.
421, 421 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
64. Advanced Mktg. Servs. 360 B.R. at 424 (noting that the warehouse clubs included Costco
Wholesale Corporation, SAM’s Club, and BJ’s Wholesale Club).
65. Id.
66. Id. AMS filed voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on
December 29, 2006. That same day, S&S sent a reclamation demand to AMS. Id.
67. Id. The Complaint for Reclamation of Goods Pursuant to § 546(c) and Related Relief
(“Complaint”) filed on January 5, 2007, sought (i) reclamation of goods in aggregate amount of
approximately $5 million that S&S alleges were received pre-petition by AMS (the “Goods”), (ii)
immediate payment to S&S of certain administrative expense claims, and (iii) accounting of the Goods.
Id.
68. Id. at 424. (noting that the motion for TRO filed on January 11, 2007, sought an order directing
AMS (i) to stop selling the Goods, (ii) to segregate the Goods from any other inventory in AMS’s
possession, (iii) to provide S&S with an accounting of Goods, and (iv) to provide S&S access to the
Goods for inspection).
69. Id. The TRO hearing was held on January 17, 2007. Order denying TRO was issued on
January 22, 2007. Id.
70. Id. at 426.
71. Id. at 424.
72. Id. The availability of Senior Facility was determined by a formula based upon AMS’s
accounts receivable and inventory subject to adjustment and reserves established by Foothill and Senior
Lenders. Id.
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substantially all of its assets, including inventory.73 This means that Senior
Lenders’ first priority security interest extended to the Goods that S&S
desires to reclaim.
There were numerous restrictions on AMS’s ability to access their
cash since virtually all of the AMS’s cash from operations was swept daily
into an account controlled by Foothill and applied to outstanding loans, and
then re-advanced as loans in accordance with the borrowing formula.74 At
the time of the bankruptcy petition, the principal amount for Revolving
Loans exceeded $41.5 million.75 On the date of the bankruptcy petition,
AMS sought an interim order for post-petition financing, which the Court
granted (the “Interim DIP Order”).76 Pursuant to this order, AMS was able
to continue to receive financing from Foothill and other Senior Lenders,
including cash advanced and other extensions of credit, but in an aggregate
principal amount of $75 million (the “DIP Loan”).77 The terms of the postpetition agreement did not extinguish AMS’s obligations under the Senior
Facility or discharge any related security interests.78
The court denied S&S’s application for a TRO.79 The Court found
that (1) goods S&S attempted to reclaim were subject to prior secured liens,
(2) S&S was unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its
reclamation claim, (3) S&S failed to establish the existence of any
irreparable harm, and (4) S&S failed to establish the balance of equities to
support granting of an injunction.80 In particular, the Court stated that the
goods S&S supplied to AMS became subject to pre-petition and post-

73. Advanced Mktg. Servs. 360 B.R. at 424.
74. Id. at 424–25.
75. Id. at 424. Senior Lenders assert and the Debtors have agreed that as of the Petition Date the
Debtors were obligated to the Senior Lenders for the principal amount drawn on Revolving Loans plus
accrued and unpaid interest and certain additional unpaid fees in an amount not less than
$41,514,347.58. Id.
76. Id. at 425 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
77. Id.
78. Id. (noting that the DIP Loan was secured by a lien on all of the AMS’s pre-petition, present
and future assets. This DIP Loan was senior to all other liens other than validly perfected Pre-Petition
Liens. Senior Lenders were granted a superpriority administrative expense claim senior to all other
administrative claims. Further, the DIP Loan Agreement provided that Pre-Petition Liens granted to the
Senior Lenders continue in full force and effect, and secure repayment of all obligations owed to the
lenders under the DIP Loan Agreement.).
79. In issuing its decision, the Court followed the temporary restraining order (“TRO”) standard
prescribed in Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290
F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002). In order to issue TRO, the Court must be convinced that the following
factors are met: “(1) the likelihood that the moving party will succeed on the merits; (2) the extent to
which the moving party will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief; (3) the extent to which
the nonmoving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest.”
Id.
80. Advanced Mktg. Servs., 360 B.R. at 429.
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petition liens and claims.81 The Court relied on section 546(c) which states
that the supplier’s rights are “subject to the prior rights of a holder of a
security interest in such goods or proceeds thereof.”82 Accordingly, the
Court held that Senior Lenders’ pre-petition and post-petition liens on the
AMS’s inventory are superior to S&S’s reclamation claim.83
2. In re Dana Corp.
Another bankruptcy court provided further interpretation and
application of section 546(c) in In re Dana Corp.84 Dana Corporation
(“Dana”) and its non-debtor affiliates (“Dana Companies”) are
manufacturers and suppliers of modules, systems and components for
original equipment manufacturers and service customers in automotive
industry.85 Dana and its forty domestic direct and indirect subsidiaries
(“Debtors”) filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11.86 Within a month, the
Court issued a Reclamation Order establishing procedures for resolving
reclamation claims.87 Over 450 creditor-suppliers sent letters to the
Debtors asserting their reclamation rights and demanding return of
previously shipped goods in an aggregate amount of more than $297
million.88 In response, the Debtors asserted that reclamation rights are
subject to superior rights of a security interest holder on the reclamation
goods (“Prior Lien Defense”), which rendered all of the reclamation rights
valueless.89

81. Advanced Mktg. Servs., 360 B.R. at 426.
82. Id.
83. Advanced Mktg. Servs., 360 B.R. at 426. The Court stated that by this reason alone S&S failed
to establish any likelihood of success in establishing a valid reclamation claim under § 546(c). Id.
84. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 409 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
85. Id. at 410 (noting that Dana and Dana Companies manufactured and supplied modules, systems
and components for original equipment manufacturers and service customers in cars, vans, sport-utility
vehicles, trucks, and a wide variety of off highway vehicles. The Dana Companies operated in
approximately twenty-five states, as well as in Mexico, Canada, eleven countries in Europe and
fourteen countries elsewhere in the world. As disclosed in Dana’s Form 10-K filed on April 27, 2006,
in 2005 the Dana Companies recorded revenue of approximately $8.7 billion and had assets of
approximately $7.4 billion and liabilities totaling $6.8 billion.).
86. Id. at 410 (stating that Dana filed bankruptcy on March 3, 2006).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 410–411.
89. Id. at 411 (stating that in the Debtors’ opinion, the holding of In re Dairy Mart Convenience
Stores Inc., 302 B.R. 128, 134–36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003), language of § 546(c), and the existence of
prior liens on the reclaimed goods rendered otherwise valid reclamation claims valueless and entitled
them only to general unsecured claims).
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Prior to bankruptcy, Dana borrowed money to support its operations
(“Prepetition Credit Facility”).90 Under the Prepetition Credit Facility
agreement, each creditor received a security interest in Dana’s equipment,
inventory, accounts, and certain other current assets.91 When Dana
declared bankruptcy, borrowings under the Prepetition Credit Facility
equaled $381 million, while the value of Dana’s assets exceeded the value
of pre-petition indebtedness.92 On the date of bankruptcy filing, Dana
entered into interim agreement for post-petition financing that allowed it to
pay off its prior debts.93 Thereafter, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Final
DIP order, which approved DIP facility financing.94 The Final DIP Order
authorized the Debtors to refinance the Prepetition Indebtedness with the
proceeds of the DIP Facility.95 Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the
DIP Facility and the Final DIP Order, the Debtors repaid the Prepetition
Indebtedness in full using funds borrowed under the DIP Facility.96
In response to the reclamation demands made by suppliers, Dana
asserted a Prior Lien Defense and claimed that any rights to reclamation of
goods are worthless. Further, Dana contended that because the pre-petition
indebtedness exceeded the value of each individual reclamation claim and
because goods subject to reclamation claims were disposed as part of the
transaction to repay the prior claims of lien holders, the reclamation claims
are valueless.97
In response to Dana’s assertions, the suppliers filed opposition
responses claiming the pre-petition secured debt was not paid with the
proceeds of reclaimed goods, but instead with the proceeds of the DIP
90. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 412 (noting that under the Prepetition Credit Facility, Dana had
access to $400 million of revolving credit, of which up to a maximum $100 million could be utilized for
letters of credit).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 412.
93. Id. at 412–13. (stating that the Interim DIP Order issued by the Bankruptcy Court (1)
authorized Debtor to obtain $1.45 billion in secured post-petition financing, and (2) utilized the prepetition lenders cash collateral and grated adequate protections to the pre-petition lenders. Under the
DIP Facility and pursuant to the Interim DIP Order, the lenders (the “DIP Lenders”) were granted a
valid, binding, continuing, enforceable, fully perfected first priority senior priming security interest in
and lien (the “DIP Lien”) upon all prepetition and post-petition property of the Debtors, whether now
existing or hereafter acquired, that is subject to the existing liens. Further, the Interim DIP Order stated
that there was no cross-collateralization of pre-petition or post-petition liens).
94. Id. at 413 (noting that the Bankruptcy Court approved “the DIP Facility on a final basis and
authorized the use of the Prepetition Lenders’ cash collateral and the granting of the DIP Lien and the
Replacement Lien to the DIP Lenders and Prepetition Lenders, respectively.” Further, the Final DIP
Order authorized the Debtors to refinance the Prepetition Indebtedness with the proceeds of the DIP
Facility).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Loan. Suppliers argued that reclamation rights were only subject to a prior
lien, that pre-petition debt was satisfied from a source other than the
reclaimed goods, and that the reclaimed goods were liberated from the
prior lien and reclamation claims must be valued in full.98 In regards to the
asserted Prior Lien Defense, the suppliers argued that their reclamation
rights were not extinguished by the existence of prior lien, but only
rendered subordinate to the prior lien, and that Prepetition Lenders were
over secured; thus permitting the claimants to recover from any excess
value.99
The court held for Dana and stated that the Prior Lien Defense
asserted by Dana rendered suppliers’ reclamation rights valueless.100 The
court stated that reclaiming suppliers do not have a right to compel a lien
holder to satisfy its claim from other collateral.101 Thus, if the value of any
given reclaiming supplier’s goods does not exceed the amount of debt
secured by the prior lien, that reclamation claim is valueless.102 The court
analogized the current case to In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.,
which held that sale of goods in satisfaction of pre-petition debt renders all
reclamation claims for those goods valueless.103

98. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 413.
99. Id. at 418.
100. Id. at 421.
101. Id. at 419 (stating that reclamation is an in rem remedy, and reclaiming sellers have no right to
compel a lienholder to satisfy its claim from other collateral). See Galey & Lord Inc. v. Arley Corp. (In
re Arlco, Inc.), 239 B.R. 261, 275 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that “a party seeking reclamation . . .
may not compel the application of marshalling against a good faith purchaser”); Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Advanced Mktg. Servs. (In re Advanced Mktg. Servs.), 360 B.R. 421, 427 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007)
(ruling that “unsecured creditors cannot invoke the equitable doctrine of marshaling”).
102. Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 419. See Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corp. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp. (In re Pittsburgh-Canfield Corp.), 309 B.R. 277, 287 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
“[r]eclaiming seller is not entitled to administrative expense priority or lien without showing that claim
has value outside of bankruptcy”); see also In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores Inc., 302 B.R. 128,
134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); Allegiance Healthcare Corp. v. Primary Health Sys. (In re Primary Health
Sys.), 258 B.R. 111, 117 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., 141 B.R. 265, 270 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1992). See C. RICHARD MCQUEEN & JACK F. WILLIAMS, TAX ASPECTS OF BANKR. L. AND
PRACT., § 7:11 (3d ed. 2006) (stating that “[t]he reality is that, in most cases, asset-based financing
provides a prior perfected lien on most goods such that the right of reclamation is rendered moot”).
103. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). See Dairy Mart Convenience
Stores, Inc., 302 B.R. at 135–136 (“[w]here the claim of a prepetition secured lender with a floating lien
on inventory is paid out of the proceeds of a post-petition credit facility supported by a new floating lien
on inventory, the reclaimed goods securing the pre-petition lender’s debt effectively have been disposed
in satisfaction of that debt. Such a sale of goods in satisfaction of prepetition secured debt renders all
reclamation claims for those goods valueless.”).
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3. In re Incredible Auto Sales
In Auto Associates of Montana v. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, a
Montana bankruptcy court resolved a proceeding involving reclamation
claims against insolvent debtor-seller of used automobiles and provided its
The parties to the bankruptcy
interpretation of section 546(c).104
proceeding were insolvent debtor Incredible Auto Sales LLC
(“Incredible”), reclaiming supplier Auction Associates of Montana, Inc.
(“AAM”), and Incredible’s floor plan lender Hyundai Motor Finance
Company (“HMFC”).105
Incredible was a retail and wholesale dealer of automobiles that
purchased a number of vehicles from supplier AAM.106 These vehicles
were sold by AAM and purchased by Incredible in the ordinary course of
business during the forty-five day period prior to Incredible’s filing for
bankruptcy.107 Incredible took possession of all the vehicles, displayed
them on its retail lot, and offered them for sale to customers.108 AAM
transferred original certificates of title to Incredible for all but one
vehicle.109 Incredible tendered a payment for several vehicles sold, which
was returned for insufficient funds.110 Thereafter, Incredible notified AAM
that it also was unable to pay for the remainder of the vehicles.111
As Incredible’s floor lender, HMFC held a security interest in all of
Incredible’s used vehicle inventory.112 The terms of the floor plan stated
that Incredible had to pay for vehicles with its own funds.113 Upon receipt
104. Auto Auction Assocs. of Mont., Inc. v. Incredible Auto Sales LLC (In re Incredible Auto Sales
LLC), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *31 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26, 2007).
105. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *2–5 (noting that the Incredible filed
for bankruptcy protection of Chapter 11 on October 17, 2006).
106. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *3.
107. Id. (noting that AAM sold seven used vehicles to Incredible pre-petition. In early October
2006, Incredible purchased the Subject Vehicles through AAM). See id. at *6 (stating that “[w]hen
AAM sold the Subject Vehicles to Incredible, it did so in the ordinary course of business at a time when
Incredible was insolvent, all of which occurred within forty-five days of the commencement of the
case”).
108. Id. at *5.
109. Id.
110. Id. (noting that tendered checks by Incredible for three cars were returned for insufficient
funds).
111. Id.
112. Id. at *3–7 (noting that HMFC holds a properly perfected security interest in “[a]ll inventory of
new and used motor vehicles and other personal property held for sale or lease including, but not
limited to, display or demonstration items, returns and repossessions, and accessories and additions
thereto.” HMFC’s security interest is evidenced by Inventory Loan and Security Agreement and three
financing statements filed with the Montana Secretary of State’s office.).
113. Id. at *7.
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of vehicles’ certificates of title, Incredible would fax the copies to HMFC,
which in return would fund the entire purchase for vehicles bought at an
auction, and eighty percent for vehicles bought directly from the seller.114
On the same date Incredible filed for bankruptcy, AAM timely filed a
reclamation claim for vehicles sold to Incredible.115 HMFC asserted that its
security interest in Incredible’s inventory is superior to AAM’s reclamation
rights.116 Shortly after the filing for bankruptcy, the court granted a joint
motion for HMFC and AAM to sell the used vehicles sold by AAM to
Incredible at the auction to prevent their future deprecation in value and
thereafter distribute the proceeds in accordance with the court’s decision.117
The net proceeds from the sale of vehicles were insufficient to pay either
AAM or HMFC the full amount of their respective claims.118
The bankruptcy court had to decide who had the security interest in
the goods, whether that security interest attached, and who was entitled to
the proceeds of vehicle sale.119 Like the courts in Advanced Marketing
Services and In re Dana, this court also based its decision on the expressed
language of section 546(c) which reads “subject to the prior rights of a
holder of a security interest in such goods or proceeds thereof.”120 This
bankruptcy court stated that floor plan lenders, like HMFC, are capable of
possessing pre-petition or post-petition inventory liens and holding superior
rights to reclamation holders.121
114. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *7.
115. Id. at *6 (stating that “AAM provided a timely written demand to Incredible for reclamation of
the Subject Vehicles.”).
116. Id. at *3, *14–15 (noting that in its claims AAM contends (1) its reclamation claims are
superior to HMFC perfected inventory flooring loan; (2) course of performance and course of dealings
establish that the auction transactions were never completed as full payment was not made so HMFC’s
security interest could never attach; (3) Incredible’s misconduct, i.e., its knowledge that the proffered
checks were worthless, prevented Incredible from obtaining rights in the vehicles; (4) that HMFC did
not act in good faith as HMFC was not merely enforcing its rights but restructuring how it dealt with
Incredible. In response, HMFC contends that (1) its inventory flooring loan is superior to AAM’s
reclamation claims and (2) its security interest attached to the above described vehicles because
Incredible obtained rights in the vehicles securing its inventory flooring lien.).
117. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *8–9 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26, 2007)
(stating that the parties’ substantive rights were unaffected by the sale of the vehicles. To the extent
either party had a right in the vehicles sold, such party now had the rights in the sale proceeds).
118. Id. at *9.
119. Id. at *20–21 (“[T]he issue becomes whether the debtor has rights in the collateral, as the Court
based on the stipulated facts concludes that value has been given and Debtor has authenticated a
security agreement describing the collateral. If Incredible . . . has rights in the collateral . . . then
[HMFC’s] flooring security interest will be superior to AAM’s reclamation claim”). See Deborah
Thorne, Reclamation under the New § 546(c)(1): Illusory Remedy as Ever: In re Dana Corp. and
Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 26 ABI J. 5 (2007).
120. See Thorne, supra note 119.
121. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *19–20 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26,
2007) (noting that “[f]looring lenders for businesses with perfected security interests in pre and post-
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The court stated that the lender HMFC was entitled to all of the
proceeds of the vehicles, except one vehicle for which the certificate of title
was not provided. The court held for HMFC due to its security interest in
the vehicles, because AAM delivered titles for the vehicles, and because
Incredible tendered checks and took possession of the vehicles sold.122 The
court ruled that HMFC had a security interest that attached to Incredible’s
inventory, where the certificates of title were delivered.123 This included
the used vehicles that Incredible purchased from AAM, except for the
vehicle for which certificate of title was not delivered.124 Thus, HMFC’s
lien on vehicles for which it received title was superior to reclamation
claims asserted by AAM.125 As a result, the court stated that AAM was
entitled to recover the proceeds from the sale of one vehicle for which the
certificate of title was not provided, while HMFC was entitled to the
remaining proceeds.126
4. Practice under New Section 546(c)
The enactment of section 546(c) did not provide the anticipated
expansion of supplier’s rights. As a matter of practice, section 546(c) has
not resulted in much benefit to suppliers due to their subordination to prior
floating and post-petition liens on inventory.127 The bankruptcy court
decisions in AMS, Dana, and Incredible Auto sales confirm that “sellers of
goods should not expect the new section 546(c) and the forty-five-day
reach-back to improve their position.”128 These cases show that supplier’s
reclamation rights are often worthless because the insolvent debtor’s
inventory is subject to prior floating liens on after-acquired property.129
The AMS case suggests that under the BAPCPA the reclamation
became a “hollow remedy” when a debtor has a pre-petition secured claim
that exceeds the value of the reclamation goods.130 The AMS showed that

petition inventory held superior rights to a seller’s reclamation rights under the Uniform Commercial
Code (“UCC”) or the bankruptcy code. The Court looks to State law to determine the property rights of
the respective parties”).
122. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *3, *21, *31–32.
123. Id. at *20–21.
124. Id. See Thorne, supra note 119, at 2 (stating that “[w]here title had not passed, the security
interest had not attached and AAM was entitled to reclaim its vehicles”).
125. See Thorne, supra note 119, at 2.
126. Incredible Auto Sales LLC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *3, *31–32.
127. Lee Harrington & Francis Morrisey, Retail Reclamation Claims: “Give Me Back My Stuff (or
at Least Pay Me For It)”, AM. BANKR. INST., NORTHEAST BANKR CONF., 300–01 (2009).
128. See Thorne, supra note 119.
129. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 313.
130. Bruce S. Nathan, Reclamation Rights Under BAPCPA: The Same Old Story, BUS.
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BAPCA’s new forty-five-day reclamation period is of limited utility
because the insolvent buyer may not be in possession of the goods when
the supplier seeks to enforce reclamation rights.131 In AMS, S&S sought to
reclaim goods sold immediately after the commencement of bankruptcy, at
the hearing three weeks later only a fraction, $800,000 out of $5 million, of
the S&S goods remained in AMS’s possession.132
The Dana case demonstrated that suppliers must be wary of effects
DIP financing might have on pre-petition debt. Even though suppliers’
reclamation rights are subject to prior rights of a security interest holder,
suppliers’ opportunity for successful reclamation of goods may be further
reduced by unfavorably drafted DIP agreement. Dana suggests that to
preserve reclamation rights, suppliers need to object in a timely fashion to
provisions inconsistent with their reclamation rights in DIP orders that
debtors and other post-petition lenders present to bankruptcy courts for
approval.133
The Incredible Auto Sales case affirmed that bankruptcy courts in
different circuits are interpreting section 546(c) similarly. Further, the
court confirmed that suppliers cannot reclaim their goods when their
reclamation rights are subordinate to those of secured lenders. The court
held that supplier may receive some compensation for its goods, if supplier
does not deliver the certificate of title of the goods sold to the insolvent
debtor.134
Together these cases show that the enactment of BAPCPA’s section
546(c) did not provide additional protection for the suppliers. Rather, the
practical consequence of section 546(c) demonstrate that the burden is on
the suppliers to protect themselves against potential losses during business
transactions with insolvent debtors or buyers nearing insolvency. The
burden is on the suppliers to do due diligence into buyer’s prior financing
arrangements with its past and current creditors. The suppliers are
responsible for being certain that the goods sold are in the buyer’s
possession when the reclamation rights are ultimately served.135

CREDIT, Apr. 2007, at 22–25.
131. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 307.
132. Id. at 308.
133. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 313.
134. Auto Auction Assocs. of Mont., Inc. v. Incredible Auto Sales LLC (In re Incredible Auto Sales
LLC), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1024, at *3, 31–32 (Bankr. D Mont. Mar. 26, 2007)
135. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 313.
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B. ADMINISTRATIVE PRIORITY STATUS UNDER SECTION 503(B)(9)
In addition to reclamation, suppliers also have the ability to seek a
priority administrative expense under BAPCPA section 503(b)(9). Proper
utilization of this section provides suppliers with an opportunity to improve
the priority of their pre-petition claim. This means that a supplier will be
able to increase the likelihood of full and faster payment for goods sold to a
financially distressed buyer that files for bankruptcy protection.
1. Application and Beneficial Aspects of Section 503(b)(9)
The BAPCPA section 503(b)(9) provides an administrative priority
status for “the value of any goods received by the debtor within twenty
days” of the petition date that “were sold to the debtor in the ordinary
course of business of such debtor’s business.”136 The reason for allowing
administrative priority status is to prevent debtors from acquiring goods on
the brink of bankruptcy filing when the debtor knows it would be unable to
pay for the purchased goods.137 The application of section 503(b)(9) is only
limited to goods,138 where presumably the price is the value of the goods.139
For the purposes of section 503(b)(9), the goods are defined by the
U.C.C.140 The provision applies to all suppliers, irrespective of whether the
supplier delivers a reclamation demand.141

136. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (West 2012) (noting that “[a]fter notice and a hearing, there shall be
allowed, administrative expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title [11 USCS
§ 502(f)], including . . . (9) the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date
of commencement of a case under this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the
ordinary course of such debtor’s business”).
137. COLLIER ON BANKR. P 503.16 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. Rev. 2011).
138. Accordingly, any claims for services or personal property other than goods are not within §
503(b)(9).
139. Judith Greenstone Miller & Jay L. Welford, 503(b)(9) Claimants – the New Constituent, A/K/A
“The 500 Pound Gorilla,” at the Table, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 487, 489 (2007) (stating that
“[p]resumably, the invoice price of the goods (exclusive of interest, freight or other charges) would be
applicable amount in valuing the claim, so long as it represents the price that was ordinarily used
between the parties”).
140. In re Samaritan Alliance, LLC, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1830, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jun. 20,
2008). Under U.C.C. § 2-103(k), the term “goods” means all things that are movable at the time of
identification to a contract for sale. The term includes future goods, specially manufactured goods, the
unborn young of animals, growing crops, and other identified things attached to realty as described in
U.C.C. § 2-107. The term does not include information, the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities under Article 8, the subject matter of foreign exchange transactions, or chooses in
action. See Rudolph J. Di Massa Jr. & Matthew E. Hoffman, UCC Definition of “Goods” Applies to
§503(b)(9), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2009 (providing insight on the definition of goods).
141. Miller & Welford, supra note 139, at 489. See Lisa Gretchko, The Bankruptcy Reform Act One
Year Later: A Disappointment for Trade Creditors, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 18, 18 (2007).
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The section 503(b)(9) claim is particularly beneficial for suppliers
because it ranks second on the bankruptcy priority list, and provides
suppliers the same payment priority as debtor’s professionals.142 In most
bankruptcy cases, administrative claims are paid in full.143 Further, a
remedy under section 503(b)(9) is independent of reclamation claim under
section 546(c), which means that reclamation defenses available to
insolvent debtors under section 546(c) do not apply.144
A supplier who exercises this right can be in a better position than
unsecured creditors since the Chapter 11 reorganization plan cannot be
confirmed unless all administrative expense claims are paid. Unsecured
creditors typically receive only a fraction of their claims.
2. Negative Implications of Section 503(b)(9)
The application of section 503(b)(9) has its own drawbacks that
impact suppliers. First, in order to obtain the administrative expense, the
suppliers need to file a motion for allowance and payment of an
administrative claim where they have the burden of proving that the claim
is in fact administrative.145 Failure to timely file may preclude recovery
and the filing dates vary by jurisdictions.146 This requires an engagement of
counsel and payment of undesired legal fees.147 Since section 503(b)(9)
claims are adverse to general unsecured claims due to priority, suppliers
with section 503(b)(9) claims cannot rely on the committee of unsecured
creditors to protect their interests.148 As a result, these suppliers must either
defend their administrative claim alone or form their own ad hoc own
committee.149 Again, this imposes undesired legal expenses on the
suppliers.
Second, even if the supplier is awarded a section 503(b)(9)
administrative claim, it may not get paid. The bankruptcy estate may
become administratively insolvent, in which case the awarded section
142. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2010).
143. Stephen Selbst, BAPCPA Turns Three, COM. LENDING REV., Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 9–16 (noting
that “[i]n most cases, administrative claims are paid in full, rather than pennies on the dollar for general
unsecured claims”).
144. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). See Gretchko, supra note 141, at 19.
145. In re Collins & Aikman Corp., 384 B.R. 751, 759 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting that “[a]
creditor seeking administrative expense priority has the burden of proving that its claim is within
section 503”).
146. Miller & Welford, supra note 139, at 490. See In re Ward Prod., LLC, Case No. 06-50527
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) (exemplifying various filing dates).
147. Gretchko, supra note 141, at 19.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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503(b)(9) claim will not be paid in full or at all.150 Supplier’s section
503(b)(9) claim itself affects the bankruptcy estate because it provides for
another claim that needs to paid, which may reduce the amount other
claimants may receive.151 The DIP financing orders may provide lenders
with first-priority liens on all assets, which include the administrative
claims.152 As a result, suppliers with section 503(b)(9) claims will be paid
after DIP lenders are paid.
Third, the payment of section 503(b)(9) claims may be delayed by the
debtor or by the creditor committee. Under section 1129(a)(9) of the
Bankruptcy Code, administrative claims are not required to be paid until
the effective date of a Chapter 11 plan.153 Although the case law requires
committee to act in the best interest of its constituency,154 committees are
often composed of unsecured creditors with personal agendas and interests.
Thus, stalling by other creditors opposing the plan may delay any payments
to the supplier with a valid section 503(b)(9) expense.
Fourth, supplier’s aggressive actions to obtain administrative claim
payments by seeking adequate assurance from the debtor or by pushing for
conversion of the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 often do not provide
any additional benefits. Suppliers are unwilling to seek conversion because
if the case is converted to Chapter 7 liquidation the obtained proceeds may
not be sufficient to reach and pay any administrative claims.155 For
instance, in In re Southern Prods., Inc. an ad hoc committee filed a request

150. Gretchko, supra note 141, at 19.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 44 (noting that “[a]lthough trade creditors argue that this favorable treatment should be
limited to “new cash” from the lender, some courts overrule that objection. Aggressive administrative
claimants might seek a carve-out from the secured creditor’s collateral or an assignment of other assets
in order to ensure payment of the § 503(b)(9) claim. But the single trade creditor is often unwilling to
finance that fight, or doesn’t have enough at stake to warrant the legal expense”).
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (2010). See In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS
3608, at *9–10 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 21, 2006) (stating that “Section 503 does not specify a time for
payment of these expenses but administrative expenses must be paid in full on the effective date of the
plan as provided in §1129(a)(9)”).
154. In re Haskell-Dawes, Inc., 188 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating that “the creditors
appointed to the creditors’ committee have a fiduciary obligation to act in the interests of the members
whom they represent”); In re Nationwide Sports Distribs., Inc., 227 B.R. 455, 463 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1998) (stating that the purpose of committees is to “represent the interests of unsecured creditors and to
strive to maximize the bankruptcy dividend paid to that class of creditors”).
155. Gretchko, supra note 141, at 44–45 (stating that “[t]rade creditors might seek adequate
assurance that their administrative claims will be paid, and if the debtor is unable to provide that
assurance, then they might be able to push for conversion of the case. However, some trade creditors
are loath to seek conversion of the bankruptcy case because that would result in a liquidation of the
debtor and the trade creditor would lose a customer, let alone the risk that the liquidation proceeds are
not sufficient to reach administrative claims. Also, these protections are theoretical, at best, to the single
trade creditor that doesn’t want to pay the legal fees inherent in obtaining them”).
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for payment of section 503(b)(9) claims.156 The debtors opposed the
motion for payment. Eventually, the case was converted to Chapter 7 and
issues pertaining to payment of section 503(b)(9) claims were deferred
until the trustee could discover whether the funds existed for payment of
the administrative claims. When the trustee allowed claimants’ claims,
there was no money in the estate to pay them.157 Accordingly, due to the
incentives of better financial recovery, the suppliers are better off staying in
Chapter 11.
Fifth, section 503(b)(9) only permits the allowance of an
administrative expense claim where the supplier can demonstrate “that the
debtor has received the goods, and not just their value.”158 In In re Plastech
Engineered Prods., a supplier sold goods to the debtor in the ordinary
course of the debtor’s business in the twenty days prior to debtor filing for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.159 The supplier’s invoices stated that the goods
were sold to the debtor, were billed to the debtor, but were shipped to a
third party with whom the debtor had a separate agreement.160 The
supplier’s invoices also indicated that payment for the goods was to be
made by the debtor directly to the supplier.
The supplier filed a motion requesting an order allowing section
503(b)(9) expense for goods sold to a debtor during twenty days before the
bankruptcy petition.161 The supplier argued that the value of the goods was
received by the debtor and that the debtor had possession of the goods.162
The debtor objected claiming that the goods were not received by the
debtor as required by the statute, but were instead received by a third
party.163 The court held for the debtor and stated that section 503(b)(9)

156. In re Southern Prods., Inc., 2005 WL No. 05-61822 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.) (noting that in addition,
Motion for Return of Goods under § 546(c) was also filed).
157. Gretchko, supra note 141 (stating that “[a]ccording to Deborah Kovsky-Apap of Pepper
Hamilton LLP (the firm representing the ad hoc committee), the chapter 7 trustee eventually allowed
the claimants’ reclamation claims and their § 503(b)(9) claims, all as chapter 11 administrative claims
—but as of Jan. 3, 2007, there has been no money in the estate to pay them!”).
158. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. 147, 151 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2008) (stating
that “§ 503(b)(9) only permits the allowance of an administrative expense claim where the
administrative expense claimant demonstrates that the debtor has received the goods, and not just their
value”).
159. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. at 151.
160. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. at 151. The debtor and third party had an agreement
entitled Extended Enterprise Agreement, which also reflected that supplier would ship the goods it sold
to the debtor directly to third party. The supplier was not a party to the Extended Enterprise Agreement
and its other terms are not set forth in the record. There was no contract between supplier and third
party. Id.
161. Id. at 149 (stating that the amount of § 503(b)(9)expense was $104,676.32).
162. Id. at 149–150.
163. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2008).
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requires the debtor to receive goods, not just the value of such goods.164 As
a result of shipping the goods to the third party as requested by the debtor,
the supplier could not receive the administrative expense priority status and
diminished its chances of obtaining a full payment on its sale.
Sixth, section 503(b)(9) only applies to goods. In In re Goody’s
Family Clothing, Inc., a debtor that operated approximately 350 familyapparel retail stores, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.165 During the twenty
days prior to debtor’s petition date, one of debtor’s service providers
submitted a bill for inspecting, ticketing, and repackaging apparel that the
debtor purchased from other vendors.166 The debtor objected asserting that
the claim was misclassified because it was for the services provided and
not for the goods sold.167 The court held for the debtor and stated that the
term “goods” does not encompass services, thus denying creditor’s section
503(b)(9) claim.168
Seventh, a supplier may not compel an immediate payment of a
section 503(b)(9) claim.169 In In re Global Home Prods., LLC., creditorsupplier, Industria Mexicana de Aluminio, S.A. de C.V. (“IMASA”), filed
a motion for allowance and immediate payment of a section 503(b)(9)
claim.170 In their motion, IMASA argued that it is inequitable to delay the
payment of administrative expense claim due to its priority.171 The debtor
opposed the motion and claimed the financing order prohibited the
payment of the claims or expenses.172 Debtor argued that they are only to
pay administrative claims that are directly attributable to the operation of
the business in the ordinary course of business and in accordance with the
financing agreements, or by approval by the court and the DIP lender.173
Debtor also argued that a payment of IMASA’s administrative claim could
constitute default under the financing agreements and violate provisions of
164. In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. at 152.
165. In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 401 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
166. Id. at 133 (noting that the bill amounted to $63,118.50).
167. In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 401 B.R. at 133.
168. Id. at 137.
169. Selbst, supra note 143, at 13.
170. In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *6 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 21,
2006) (noting that IMASA has requested allowance of its claims for the aluminum as an administrative
expense claim in the amount of the full value of the goods and that Debtors make payment within three
business days of the Court’s entry of an order granting the Motion).
171. In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *7 (noting that additionally,
IMASA claimed that it is entitled to adequate protection of its interest in cash collateral).
172. Id. at *8 (noting that Paragraph 1.2 of the Final Financing Order prohibits Debtors’ use of loan
proceeds for payment of claims not provided for in the financing agreements and budget without the
Court’s approval. Section 5.2 of the Ratification Agreement also restricts Debtors’ use of DIP
Financing proceeds to pay administrative claims).
173. Id.
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the financing order.174 The Debtor claimed that immediate payment of
§503(b)(9) claims would expose the Debtor to financial risk by adversely
affecting its borrowing ability.175 Finally, the Debtor contended that
§503(b)(9) does not require immediate payment and that it is silent on the
issue of timing.176
When a claimant timely files a request for payment of an
administrative expense under section 503(a), the timing of the payment of
that administrative claim is left to the discretion of the court.177 The court
stated that three factors are considered in determining when to pay the
administrative claim: (1) the prejudice to the debtors, (2) hardship to the
claimant, and (3) potential detriment to other creditors.178
In denying IMASA’s motion for immediate right to payment, the court
found that IMASA would suffer little prejudice or hardship if
administrative payment is deferred until confirmation of the plan.179 The
court also found that due to Debtors financial position and requirements of
the DIP financial agreement, Debtors will suffer substantial hardship if the
immediate payment on IMASA’s section 503(b)(9) claim is presently
allowed.180
In another case, In re Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., a different bankruptcy
court decided that a creditor who holds an allowed administrative expense
under section 503(b)(9) is not entitled to an immediate payment of the
allowed expense.181 Bookbinder’s Restaurant (“Bookbinder’s”) filed a
voluntary petition under Chapter 11 and continued its operations, while the
committee of unsecured creditors was appointed.182 Bookbinder’s five
creditors, each of which supplied goods to Bookbinder’s within twenty
days of bankruptcy filing, requested the allowance of an administrative

174. In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *8.
175. Id. at *8–9 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 21, 2006)
176. Id. at *9.
177. Id. at *10–11. In re Garden Ridge Corp., 323 B.R. 136, 143 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (noting the
discretion); Varsity Carpet Servs. v. Richardson (In re Colortex Indus.), 19 F.3d 1371, 1384 (11th Cir.
1994). See also In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 146 B.R. 520, 531 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) (stating that
“[i]n making this determination, one of the chief factors courts consider is bankruptcy’s goal of an
orderly and equal distribution among creditors and the need to prevent a race to a debtor’s assets”).
178. In re Global Home Prods., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *12–13.
179. Id. at *15–16.
180. In re Global Home Prods., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608, at *15–16.
181. In re Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28,
2006).
182. The “Old Original Bookbinders” is well known in the region as a “landmark” restaurant
located in Center City, Philadelphia. It is a not-for-profit corporation founded by the City of
Philadelphia and the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce to promote economic development in
the City, the restaurant began operated continuously from 1865 to 2001.
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expense under section 503(b)(9).183 The five creditors disagreed as to the
timing of the payments of their administrative expenses under section
503(b)(9). One creditor agreed that expenses should be paid when all
administrative expenses are paid and three other creditors agreed to defer
the actual payment until the later date.184 The fifth creditor, Blue Crab Plus
Sfd. (“Blue Crab”), insisted on immediate payment of its allowed
expense.185
Blue Crab argued that section 503(b)(9) requires debtor to treat
administrative expenses in the same manner as administrative expenses
arising from the post-petition delivery of goods and services,186 and that
Debtor was financially able to make the payment.187 Bookbinder opposed
the motion and argued that (1) payment of administrative expenses is
within the discretion of the bankruptcy court; (2) monthly financial reports
do not fully reflect operational reality, which is less liquid than it might
appear; and (3) immediate payment to Blue Crab will impair its cash
position and jeopardize its reorganization.188
The court exercised its discretion and ruled against Blue Crab. The
court stated that section 503(b)(9) does not provide an explicit instruction
for an immediate payment of administrative expenses to Blue Crab. To
grant an automatic right to immediate payment of administrative expense to
Blue Crab would expand the statutory provision and derogate the accepted
principle that the timing of payment of an allowed administrative expense
is within the court’s discretion.189 Further, the Court stated that Blue Crab
failed to present authority supporting the contention that a section 503(b)
administrative interest holder has an unqualified legal entitlement to be

183. Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *3–4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2006).
184. Id. at *5 (stating that “[o]ne of the five creditors, [U.S. Food Service, Inc.,] agreed that its
expense should be paid when the Debtor pays other administrative expenses in the case. Three of the
five creditors [Killian’s Harvest Green, Fichera Foods, Inc. and OceanPro Industries, Ltd.] agreed to
defer the actual payment of the allowed administrative expense for the time being, while reserving the
right to request immediate payment at a later time”).
185. Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *5.
186. Id. at *6 (noting that at the hearing, Blue Crab argued that if the Debtor was paying its utility
bills, it was equally obligated to pay its § 503(b)(9) administrative expenses).
187. Id. (noting that Blue Crab stated that Debtor’s monthly operating report stated that Debtor had
over $200,000, which was sufficient to pay Blue Crab’s claim of $33,021.74).
188. Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *7.
189. Id. at *16 (noting that § 503(b)(9) does nothing more than “define a type of liability, previously
treated as pre-petition claim, which is now accorded administrative expense status. The text of §
503(b)(9) neither states or even implies the allowance of the expense encompasses an unqualified right
to immediate payment. Nor does the text of provision suggest that an administrative expense allowed
under § 503(b)(9) is to be treated in a more favorable manner than any other allowed § 503(b)
administrative expense.” The Court noted that it is unaware of existence of any legislative history that
would support Blue Crab’s argument.). See H.R. Rep. No. 109-31 (2005) at 146.
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paid at the same time as post-petition creditors that receive payments in the
ordinary course of business.190
Because of these two cases, immediate right to payment does not exist
and the timing of administrative claims payments remains in the discretion
of the bankruptcy court.191
3. Implications of Phar-Mor, Inc.
The decision in Phar-Mor. Inc. addresses the supplier’s rights to
reclamation and administrative expense payments prior to passage of the
BAPCPA. Although the court’s decision was based on the pre-BAPCPA
laws, it provides suppliers and creditors with relevant arguments for postBAPCPA litigation.192
In, Phar-Mor, Inc., the debtor (“Phar-Mor”) filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in September 2001, but continued to operate its business as
DIP. As a result, 141 of Phar-Mor’s suppliers sent reclamation claims
seeking to recover goods they had delivered to Phar-Mor on credit totaling
over $18 million. Phar-Mor proposed that each supplier be granted an
administrative expense priority claim under section 503(b) in the amount of
its allowed reclamation claim. All but one of Phar-Mor suppliers,
McKesson, settled.
Phar-Mor’s pre-petition debt amounted to $103 million, which
consisted of loan and security agreements with some of its lenders.
Substantially all of Phar-Mor’s assets, which included all reclamation
goods and other inventory, secured this debt. As part of reorganization, the
bankruptcy court authorized Phar-Mor to borrow $135 million, which PharMor utilized to repay pre-petition secured creditors,193 thus extinguishing
their secured interests. The new creditors, the DIP lenders, received superpriority status over remaining security interests, which included priority
over any administrative expense claims, including one of McKesson.194
After Phar-Mor paid its post-petition loan from the DIP lenders, expenses,

190. Bookbinders’ Rest., Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3749, at *17. Post-petition creditors get paid in
the ordinary course of business under 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1).
191. Selbst, supra note 143, at 13.
192. Lisa Gretchko, Sixth Circuit’s Phar-Mor Decision Breathes New Life into Reclamation
Remedy, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 14, 54–55 (2008).
193. The bankruptcy court authorized Phar-Mor to borrow the $135 million and gave the DIP
Lenders super-priority status in an Interim Order issued on the petition date. Phar-Mor borrowed the
money, repaid the pre-petition secured creditors (extinguishing their security interests), and gave the
DIP Lenders super-priority security interests that same day.
194. Phar-Mor, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 534 F.3d 502, 503–04 (6th Cir. Ohio 2008).
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fees, and money allotted to reclamation claims, it was left with $30 million
towards the payment of $185.5 million of general unsecured claims.195
In February 2003, Phar-Mor motioned the bankruptcy court to
reclassify its outstanding reclamation claims as general unsecured claims.
In the support of its motion, Phar-Mor argued that supplier’s
administrative-expense priority claims were extinguished when the goods
subject to reclamation were sold with the proceeds used to pay the DIP
lenders. Conversely, the suppliers claimed that they were automatically
entitled to either an administrative expense priority claim or a lien for a full
amount of their reclamation rights allowed by section 546(c).196 The
bankruptcy court denied Phar-Mor’s motion and held that even though the
reclamation claims were rendered subject to DIP lender’s super-priority,
the suppliers had properly filed their reclamation claims and had
administrative-expense priority over the general claims.197
After having its motion for reconsideration denied twice by the
bankruptcy court, and having the district court uphold the bankruptcy court,
Phar-Mor appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, the
main issue in Phar-Mor was whether the supplier’s administrative expense
priority of its reclamation claim was barred when the goods subject to
reclamation were sold and those proceeds were used to satisfy a secured
creditor’s superior claim.198 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’
decisions and held that McKesson was properly granted its administrative
expense priority in lieu of its reclamation claim.199 In its ruling, the court
noted that the state law granted supplier a right to reclaim its goods and that
a secured creditor’s claim did not defeat that right.200 The court further
found that pre-BAPCA section 546(c)(2) granted the bankruptcy court the
power to deny a properly reclaiming supplier its right to reclaim goods, but
only if the denied supplier is either given an administrative priority in the
amount of the goods or a lien on the proceedings resulting from the use of
those goods by the debtor.201
The Phar-Mor decision is neither an anomaly nor a new trend, but
rather a pro-supplier decision based on pre-BAPCPA laws. As during the

195. Phar-Mor, Inc., 301 B.R. at 504.
196. Id. at 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 2003). See also Bruce S. Nathan, Are Reclamation Rights
Preserved Where Debtor’s Secured Dip Lender Pays Off Pre-Petition Secured Inventory Lender? Yes
and No!, BUS. CREDIT, Mar. 2004, at 16–20.
197. Phar-Mor, Inc., 301 B.R. at 504.
198. Id. at 503.
199. Phar-Mor, Inc., 301 B.R. at 504, 508.
200. Id. at 508.
201. Id. See In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores Inc., 302 B.R. 128, 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(rendering creditor’s reclamation demands valueless and reclassified them as unsecured claims).
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pre-BAPCPA period, the reclamation remains an ineffective remedy for
suppliers, as illustrated by the post-BAPCPA decisions in AMS, Dana, and
Incredible Auto Sales.202 In light of post-BAPCPA court holdings, debtors
and secured creditors are likely to interpret the Phar-Mor decision as
irrelevant to subsequent practice because Phar-Mor was confined to UCC’s
narrower reclamation period and was based on the pre-BAPCPA version of
section 546(c).203 Conversely, the suppliers may assert that the Phar-Mor
holding is an attempt by the Sixth Circuit court to send a message that it is
time to stop robbing suppliers of their remedies under UCC and the
Bankruptcy Code.204 Further, although Phar-Mor never mentions section
503(b)(9), suppliers are likely to argue that the holding is relevant to their
claims because it stands for the proposition that section 503(b)(9)
administrative remedy claims that were created post-BAPCA should not be
eviscerated like reclamation remedies.205
IV. REMEDIES UNDER STATE LAW
In addition to BAPCPA, suppliers that sold goods to an insolvent
buyer or a buyer who becomes insolvent may seek remedies available
under the applicable state law provisions of Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”).206 For the purposes of UCC, “goods” are defined as all things,
including specially manufactured goods, which are movable at the time of
identification to the contract for sale.207 Under the UCC, the buyer is
considered insolvent if: (1) the buyer generally ceased to pay debts in the
ordinary course of business other than as a result of a bona fide dispute
pertaining to those debts; (2) the buyer is unable to pay debts as they
become due; or (3) if the buyer is insolvent within the meaning of the
federal bankruptcy law.208

202. Gretchko, supra note 192, at 55. Although cases such as In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp., 52
B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985), In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992), In re
Pester Refining Co., 964 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1992), and In re Arlco, 239 B.R. 261 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1999) did not kill reclamation altogether, they rendered it a useless remedy. By the late 1990s, case law
had evolved to eviscerate completely the reclamation remedy.
203. Gretchko, supra note 192, at 54–55.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 301. (“Outside of bankruptcy, § 2-702 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) governs reclamation.”).
207. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2004). Money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities and things
in action by definition are not goods. The term “goods” also includes the unborn young of animals and
growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be
severed from realty (§ 2-107). Id.
208. U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (2004). See Nathan, supra note 130, at 22. Insolvency is based on either
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A. RESCISSION OF SALE
The UCC provides the supplier of goods on credit with remedies to
rescind the sale and reclaim the goods delivered to the insolvent buyer.209
This remedy is available when the buyer fails to perform in the accordance
with the contact,210 such as tender a payment for the purchased goods when
due.211
B. GOODS IN TRANSIT
If the supplier discovers that the buyer is insolvent, the supplier may
refuse to deliver or stop the delivery to the buyer in accordance to its
contractual obligations.212 The supplier may stop the delivery even if the
contract calls for an extension of credit terms, such as a payment due
within thirty days of the receipt of the invoice, unless the supplier is
immediately paid in cash.213
Upon learning of buyer’s insolvency, the supplier may also stop
delivery of goods in transit or in the possession of a carrier or a bailee.214
The supplier has the right to stop delivery until the insolvent buyer receives
the goods.215 The supplier may stop delivery of goods whether they are in
the balance sheet test where liabilities exceed assets, or the equity test where the debtor has ceased
paying its debts in the ordinary course of business or is unable to pay its debts as they become due. See
11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2004) for federal bankruptcy code definition of insolvency.
209. U.C.C. § 2-702(1) (2004). Seller’s Remedies on Discovery of Buyer’s Insolvency: (1) Where
the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse delivery except for cash including payment
for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (§ 2-705). (2)
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim
the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has
been made to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation
does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on
the buyer’s fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay. (3) The seller’s
right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good
faith purchaser under this Article (§ 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other
remedies with respect to them. U.C.C. § 2-705 (2004).
210. U.C.C. § 2-703(1) (2004).
211. Id., § 2-703(2)(f).
212. U.C.C. § 2-703(1), § 2-703(2)(a), § 2-703(2)(b).
213. Atwood-Kellogg, Inc. v. Nickerson Farms, 602 N.W. 2d 749, 752 (1999) (stating that the
burden is on the seller to show that the seller demand the cash payment from the buyer).
214. U.C.C. § 2-705(1) (2003). The seller may stop delivery of goods in the possession of a carrier
or other bailee when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent (§ 2-702) and may stop delivery of carload,
truckload, planeload or larger shipments of express or freight when the buyer repudiates or fails to make
a payment due before delivery or if for any other reason the seller has a right to withhold or reclaim the
goods. Id.
215. U.C.C. § 2-705(2)(a) (2003).
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possession of the carrier or a bailee.216 To prevent the delivery of the
goods, the supplier must notify the carrier or bailee.217 This notice must be
received by the carrier or bailee in sufficient time to halter the delivery.218
After such notification, the carrier or bailee must hold and deliver the
goods according to the supplier’s directions.219 As a result, the supplier is
liable to the bailee for any ensuing charges or damages.220
Once the buyer receives or has constructive possession of the goods,
the supplier’s right to stop the delivery is extinguished.221 Thereafter, the
supplier may only get the goods back through reclamation process under
the state law.222
C. CASH ON DELIVERY
The supplier may refuse delivery unless cash payment is made for all
the goods to be delivered under the contract.223 When the supplier
discovers that the buyer is insolvent, the supplier may unilaterally change
the contract terms and require buyer to pay immediately for prior deliveries
in cash.224 In addition to withholding the delivery of goods, the seller may
require additional assurances of payment only in cash for deliveries. This
rule applies even if prior deliveries were made and even if the contract’s
credit terms had not expired as to the due date of payments relating to prior
deliveries.225
The term “cash” has a specific application under the U.C.C. The term
suggests that the supplier is not required to accept a check or any other
financial instrument except for physical cash from the buyer. Although a
solvent buyer’s check is commercially normal and proper, it is
unreasonable to make supplier accept insolvent buyer’s check because of
216. U.C.C. §2-705(2)(b). (2003).
217. U.C.C. § 2-705(3)(a) (2003).
218. Id.
219. U.C.C. § 2-705(3)(b) (2003). There is an exception to this rule. If a negotiable document of
title has been issued for goods, the bailee is not obliged to obey a notification to stop until surrender of
the document. See U.C.C. § 2-705(3)(c) (2003). In addition, a carrier who has issued a nonnegotiable
bill of lading is not obliged to obey a notification to stop received from a person other than the
consignor. See U.C.C. § 2-705(3)(d) (2003).
220. Id.
221. U.C.C. § 2-705(2)(a)–(d) (2003). See Donegal Steel Foundry Co. v. Accurate Products Co.,
516 F.2d 583, 584 n. 21 (3d Cir. N.J. 1975) (noting that “[u]nder a bailment contract a bailee may be
directed to return the identical thing bailed or its product to the bailor”).
222. In re Kellstrom Indus., 282 B.R. 787, 790 n. 3 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (noting the state law
differences).
223. U.C.C. § 2-702(1) (2003).
224. In re Layton Fabrics, Ltd., 1969 WL 11021, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 14, 1969).
225. Id.

(
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the great likelihood that check will be dishonored when presented for
payment.226
D. RECLAMATION UNDER STATE LAW
In general, under the U.C.C. state law provides for the reclamation of
goods delivered to the insolvent buyer if the supplier can satisfy all of the
following conditions: (1) goods were sold to the debtor on credit terms, (2)
debtor was insolvent at the time it received the goods, and (3) the supplier
demanded return of the goods within ten days of the debtor’s receipt of the
goods.227 If the buyer makes misrepresentations to the supplier pertaining
to its solvency, the time for reclamation is extended.228 To successfully
reclaim the goods sold, some states require that the goods sold must still be
in the possession of the insolvent buyer and identifiable when the demand
is received.229
The supplier’s reclamation rights are subject to the rights of a good
faith purchaser.230 The U.C.C. defines “purchaser” as a person that takes
by a purchase231, and “purchase” as taking by sale, lease, discount,
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or reissue, gift,
or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.”232 A
purchaser of supplier’s goods from the insolvent transferor, the initial
226. 3 RICHARD W. DUESENBERG, LAWRENCE P. KING, HENRY DEEB GABRIEL, & WILLIAM H.
HENNING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE U.C.C. § 13.03 2 (Matthew Bender ed., 2011).
227. U.C.C. §2-702 (2003). Under U.C.C. section 2-705(2) a “seller may reclaim the goods upon
demand made within a reasonable time after the buyer’s receipt of the goods” where reasonable time is
defined by “nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action” under U.C.C. § 1-205(a). However, states
that adopted the UCC provide for a more definite term defining time. For example, see Chapter 106,
section 2-702(1) of the Massachusetts General Laws, “where the seller discovers the buyer to be
insolvent he may refuse delivery except for cash including payment for all goods theretofore delivered
under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (section 2-705)” and section 2-702(2) “[w]here
the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the
goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt . . . . ” See also Nathan, supra note 130, at
23.
228. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2003). Under a state law, a supplier may have unlimited time to reclaim its
goods if the buyer made a written misrepresentation of solvency within three months of supplier’s
delivery of goods. For example, chapter 106, section 2-207(2) of the Massachusetts General Laws
states: “if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within three
months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.”
229. Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. Rawson Food Serv., Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 1988); Galey &
Lord, Inc. v. Arley Corp. (In re Arlco., Inc.), 239 B.R. 261, 266–67. See Harrington & Morrisey, supra
note 127, at 301–02; Monfort, Inc. v. Kunkel (In re Morken), 182 B. R. 1007, 1017 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1995) (slaughtered cows, not identifiable at the time reclamation demand, are not subject to
reclamation).
230. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (2003).
231. U.C.C. § 1-201(30) (2003).
232. U.C.C. § 1-201(29) (2003).
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buyer, acquires all title that the insolvent transferor had or had power to
transfer.233 An insolvent buyer-transferor with voidable title has power to
transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.234
This means that a secured creditor with a floating inventory lien has a
priority over the rights of the reclaiming supplier.235 The courts have held
that secured creditors with liens on insolvent buyer’s inventory are good
faith purchasers and thus have superior rights to a reclaiming supplier.236
V. CONDITIONS THAT IMPROVE THE LEVERAGE OF A SUPPLIER
Leverage in the context of a supplier’s negotiations for payment of
accounts receivable due the supplier refers to the bargaining power that the
supplier has in negotiating favorable terms from a bankrupt or financially
troubled customer. While legislation and case law clearly disadvantage a
supplier who is owed money by a bankrupt customer, a supplier can
improve its negotiating position if it displays foresight in its contract
negotiation. Three important issues impact a supplier’s leverage: (1) the
true contract partner, (2) the nature of the contract’s duration, and (3) the
time remaining on the contract.
The courts make an important distinction between a contract involving
a supplier and a bankrupt corporation and a contract between a supplier and
one of a bankrupt corporation’s subsidiaries.237 The bankruptcy of a
corporation may not be automatically synonymous with the bankruptcy of
its subsidiaries and affiliates. Thus, a supplier who contracts with an
insolvent subsidiary of a bankrupt parent corporation can move

233. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2003). A purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of
the interest purchased. Id.
234. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2003). Under UCC, the term “good faith,” except as otherwise provided in
Article 5, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
See U.C.C. § 1-201(20). As per U.C.C. § 2-403(1), when goods have been delivered to the good faith
buyer under a transaction of purchase, the good faith buyer has such power even though (a) the
transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check
which is later dishonored, (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a “cash sale,” or (d) the
delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. Id.
235. Nathan, supra note 130, at 22. See Harrington & Morrisey, supra note 127, at 302.
236. Allegiance Healthcare Corp. v. Primary Health Svs. (In re Primary Health Sys.), 258 B.R. 111,
117 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (“[a] creditor with a prior perfected security interest in inventory which
contains an after-acquired property clause is a good faith purchaser under the UCC”).
237. See Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Coneco Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 425 (2004) (where in
denying the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and refusing to employ piercing of the corporate
veil doctrine, the court has held that the parent company was not liable for the breach of contract of its
insolvent subsidiary). See also, Brad B. Erens, Scott J. Friedman, & Kelly M. Mayerfeld, Bankrupt
Subsidiaries: The Challenges to the Parent of Legal Separation, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 66 (2008)
available at http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/bdj/25/25.1/ErensFriedman_Mayerfeld.pdf.
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expeditiously to improve the likelihood of full payment of its accounts
receivable.
The courts distinguish between the parties’ obligations under long
verses short-term contracts.238 If the contract is short-term or order-byorder, the supplier is often not required by the court to comply with the
terms of the contract on an extended basis.239 However, if the contract is
long-term, the supplier is likely to be obligated to comply with the existing
contract’s terms even when payment is delayed indefinitely or bankruptcy
of the customer is approved.240
In essence, the shorter the time remaining on a contract, the greater the
leverage a supplier has over a financially troubled or bankrupt customer. It
is unlikely that the debtor would be able to negotiate better terms with a
new supplier than it can with the current supplier, who probably has vested
interests in the debtor’s financial recovery, not the least of which is the full
payment of accounts receivable. Consequently, a supplier with little time
remaining on a contact with an insolvent or nearly insolvent debtor may be
able to renegotiate especially favorable terms for a new or extended
contract. Such terms might include requirements for accelerated or
immediate payment of outstanding receivables, cash in advance or cash on
delivery in lieu of credit terms, and an order-by-order rather than long-term
arrangement.
VI. EARLY ACTION SUPPLIER TACTICS
Upon the discovery of the customer’s insolvency, the supplier can
utilize the U.C.C. to force a renegotiation with the debtor prior to the
debtor’s bankruptcy hearing. In addition to the options described in prior
sections,241 a supplier with an ongoing contract or outstanding accounts
receivable from a bankrupt customer can consider other tactics to improve
its outcome, specifically quick positioning for contract assumption,

238. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (noting that subject to a court’s approval, a trustee may assume or reject
any executor contract of the debtor).
239. Id.
240. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 363. This section of the bankruptcy code permits the debtor in
possession or a trustee to sell property obtained from the suppliers in the regular course of business.
See also In re HLC Properties, Inc., 55 B.R. 685 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (discussing application of 11
U.S.C. 363).
241. This is relevant to U.C.C. § 2-702, which provides that a seller may refuse delivery except for
cash when it discovers the buyer to be insolvent, and to U.C.C. § 2-703, which provides that where a
buyer refuses to make payment due on or before delivery then, with respect to any goods directly
affected, the aggrieved seller (supplier) may withhold or stop delivery of goods, even if they are in
transit under U.C.C. § 2-705.
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obtaining critical supplier status, and securing adequate assurance of the
debtor’s future performance.
A. QUICK CONTRACT ASSUMPTION
A financially distressed debtor must assume or reject an executory
contract for the sale of goods before confirmation of its plan of
reorganization.242 A supplier that is a party to an executory contract is
obligated to perform during the period between the bankruptcy filing and
assumption or rejection of the contract.243 If the supplier decides to
suspend or not honor the agreement, the debtor may assert legal claims
against the supplier for breach of contract and violations of the automatic
stay.244
For a supplier, contract assumption can be advantageous because the
debtor must resolve outstanding receivables and all other monetary defaults
that arose prior to the bankruptcy.245 In addition, the debtor must give
adequate assurance of its future performance under the contract. Another
benefit is that claims under assumed contracts are assigned administrative
priority, requiring that they be paid in full on confirmation of the
bankruptcy plan. Additionally, the bankruptcy code allows compelling the
debtor to make an early assumption or rejection decision.246 Finally,
242. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2003). A contract is executory if obligations are owed by both parties to the
contract. See In re Dynamic Tooling Sys., Inc., 349 B.R. 847, 852-53 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). Under
section 541, executory contracts are part of the estate’s property. Section 1123(b)(2) states that a
bankruptcy plan may, subject to the provisions of section 365, provide for the assumption or rejection
of executory contracts. Further, section 1123(b)(3) states that a plan may not only provide for the
adjustment and settlement of any claims or interests of the debtor or the estate, but also that the trustee,
the debtor, or a special representative of the estate may retain and enforce such claims or interests.
243. Bruce S. Nathan, A Trade Creditor’s Post-Petition Obligations Under An Unexpired Executory
Contract Prior To Assumption Or Rejection: The Muddled State Of The Law, BUS. CREDIT, Sep. 2006,
at 1 (noting that “[i]f a debtor wishes to assume an executory contract or lease, the debtor must, among
other things, cure all payment and other defaults under the contract, or provide adequate assurance of
such cure, and provide adequate assurance of the debtor’s ability to perform all of its future obligations
under the contract. If the debtor rejects the contract, the debtor is deemed to have breached the contract
as of the bankruptcy filing date and the creditor has an unsecured claim for its damages arising from
such breach. Rejection also relieves the creditor of any further obligations under the contract”).
244. Id. at 2 (noting that meanwhile the debtor may compel “the creditor to continue selling goods
or providing services prior to any decision to assume or reject the contract, while the debtor is free to
seek rejection of contract (and thereby terminate any further obligation to perform) any time during the
bankruptcy case”).
245. In re United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 786 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (noting that “[i]n order to
assume an executory contract, the debtor must cure or provide adequate assurance that it will promptly
cure its default. Its default is the failure to pay the pre-petition claim in accordance with the contract.
The debtor must also give assurances of future performance”).
246. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2). Under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee may
assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real property or of personal
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assumption of the contract gives the supplier an incumbent’s advantages in
extending the contract on favorable terms. For these reasons, a supplier
may find it advantageous to position for early contract assumption.
B. CRITICAL SUPPLIER STATUS
The principle of bankruptcy law that similarly situated creditors
receive equal treatment is not universally held.247 A supplier in search of a
viable post-petition strategy for collecting payment of pre-petition
receivables should consider the benefits of being designated as a “critical
supplier.” The critical supplier doctrine is an exception created by the
courts in some states, including Delaware, Michigan, and New York, that
allows an insolvent customer to argue for special status from a particular
supplier.248 A motion to pay critical vendors is a request for the court to
authorize an exception to the general principle favoring equal treatment of

property of the debtor at any time before the confirmation of a plan but the court, on the request of any
party to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of time
whether to assume or reject such contract or lease. Id.
247. See Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921, 932 (4th Cir. Md. 1985) (noting that “[the]
longstanding principle of equal treatment of similarly situated creditors may be violated”). See also In
re Piper Aircraft Corp. 168 B.R. 434, 440 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (suggesting that the benefits of fresh start in
bankruptcy law may supersede the principal of creditor’s equal treatment).
248. The judicially created exception of “critical supplier” has its roots in the doctrine of necessity.
For example:
The policy of equal treatment of creditors does not trump freedom of contract. Absent
a contractual agreement, there is no obligation to deal with another party, whether a
party in bankruptcy or not. Without a contract, suppliers can refrain from dealing with a
debtor. Frequently, the decision to do so is based more on the uncertainty of payment
for post-petition goods and services. A problem arises when the theory of equal
treatment meets the reality that, from time to time, certain suppliers are essential to the
continued viability of a business and a debtor’s ability to reorganize. If the suppliers
legitimately decline to have further dealings with the debtor, the reorganization effort
will come to an end before it has had an opportunity to begin. In this instance, it is
impossible to reconcile the objectives of encouraging reorganizations and assuring the
equal treatment of creditors. To insist upon the latter necessarily precludes the former.
The Doctrine of Necessity is an attempt to reconcile these principles in these narrow
circumstances. The remedy, payment of select pre-petition unsecured claims, flies in
the face of all of the notions of equal treatment of creditors. It is, however, a necessary
deviation because otherwise there will be no reorganization and no creditor will have an
opportunity to recoup any part of its pre-petition claim . . . Three tests for the
application of the Doctrine of Necessity have developed which, if applied, retain the
narrowness and the exceptional quality of the Doctrine: (1) the vendor must be
necessary for the successful reorganization of the debtor; (2) the transaction must be in
the sound business judgment of the debtor; and (3) the favorable treatment of the critical
vendor must not prejudice other unsecured creditors.
See United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. at 781–82.
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similar claims, and pay one prepetition creditor ahead of others.249
Consequently, such a request is carefully scrutinized and is only granted
when the circumstances establish that the selected payments are necessary
to the reorganization case and will ultimately benefit all creditors of the
estate.250 According to the Doctrine of Necessity,251 a supplier is critical if:
(1) it is the only supplier of “essential goods and services,”252
(2) it supplies “essential goods and services at a significantly reduced
price,”253 and
(3) it would not “survive non-payment of pre-petition claims,” and
would therefore stop supplying the debtor.254
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas held that
section 105(a) of the U.C.C. authorizes bankruptcy courts to authorize
payment of prepetition claim to creditors that are critical to the debtor’s
continued operation.255 The court created the following three-element test
of the debtor for determining when payment of prepetition claim to
suppliers is critical and allowed:256 (1) evidence that dealing with the
claimant is indispensable to profitable operations or preservation of the
estate,257 (2) evidence that failing to deal with the claimant will likely cause
harm or eliminate an economic advantage that is greater than the amount
claimed,258 and (3) evidence that no practical or legal alternative exists by
which the debtor can deal with the claimant and that payment is the only

249. In re Coserv, LLC, 273 B.R. 487, 494 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). See Osborne v. Howell
Electric Motors (In re Fultonville Metal Prods. Co.), 330 B.R. 305, 313 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005)
(stating that “[t]he request to pay selected prepetition vendors is a clear departure from basic bankruptcy
precepts”).
250. Fultonville Metal Prods. Co., 330 B.R. at 313. See In re Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320
B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (where the court found that the payment of critical vendors should
be approved only upon an evidentiary showing that “(1) the payments were necessary to the debtor’s
reorganization; (2) that a sound business reason justified the payments, in that the vendors would refuse
to do business with the debtor absent the payments; and (3) that the disfavored creditors would not be
harmed by the payments”).
251. Andrew J. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: Capital
Factors v. Kmart, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jun. 2003, at 34.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 493, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
256. Id. at 498–99.
257. Id. at 498. (noting that “[t]o meet this requirement debtor must show that, for one reason or
another, dealing with the claimant is virtually indispensable to profitable operations or preservation of
the estate”).
258. Id. at 498–99 (“[A] . . . debtor must show that meaningful economic gain to the estate or to the
going-concern value of the business will result or that serious economic harm will be avoided through
payment of the prepetition claim, which itself is materially less than the potential loss to the estate or
business”).
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alternative.259
If critical supplier status is granted, (a) the supplier is paid in advance
of and at a higher percentage than other general unsecured creditors and (b)
its pre-bankruptcy claims converted into administrative claims that must be
paid in full prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization.260 However,
there is a major downside for a critical supplier, namely that the supplier is
often required by negotiations with the debtor to waive their
section 2-503 (b)(9) claims and associated rights.
C. ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE
Under U.C.C. section 2-609, if reasonable insecurity exists concerning
a debtor’s ability or willingness to satisfy its future financial obligations,
such as late payments, the supplier can issue a demand for adequate
assurance of performance.261 The debtor must then provide written
assurances to the supplier of the debtor’s ability to satisfy future
obligations, including evidence of financial viability such as a letter of
credit.262 If a debtor fails to provide the demanded adequate assurance, the
supplier has the right to modify or suspend its performance under the
contract.263
Such situations arose frequently in 2008-2009 when secondary
suppliers (tier-2) that provide products to direct suppliers (tier-1) of a
bankrupt corporation employed a tactic involving provisions of Article 2 of
the U.C.C. in an effort to receive payment for delivered goods or services.
259. CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. at 499 (stating that “[i]f payment is intended to assuage the
[creditor’s] concern about future dealings, a deposit, collect on delivery terms, payment of shipment and
countless other devices are available that will not offend the general principle that prepetition claims
should not be paid”).
260. 11 U.S.C. § 105.
261. U.C.C. section 2-609 provides: (1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that
the other’s expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds
for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party, the other may in writing demand
adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may, if commercially
reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return. (2)
Between merchants, the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance
offered shall be determined according to commercial standards. (3) Acceptance of any improper
delivery or payment does not prejudice the aggrieved party’s right to demand adequate assurance of
future performance. (4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a reasonable time,
not exceeding 30 days, such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the
particular case is a repudiation of the contract. Id.
262. Several court rulings clarify the requirements for written notice. See Nati’l Ropes, Inc. v. Nat’l
Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F. 2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975); contra, ARB, Inc. V. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Automated Energy Systems, Inc. v. Fibers and Fabrics of Georgia, Inc., 298 S.E. 2d
328 (1982); Scott v. Crown, 765 P.2d 1043 (Colo. App. 1988).
263. U.C.C. § 2-609, official cmt. 2 (2004).
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For example, tier-1 suppliers in the automobile industry filed motions
under U.C.C. section 2-609 asserting that they had reasonable grounds for
insecurity concerning the debtor’s ability to perform under the terms of the
supply contracts.264 The suppliers consequently claimed that they were
entitled to adequate assurance of future performance of the debtor as a
precondition to satisfying their own contractual obligations.265
Reasonable grounds for insecurity are determined in fact by
commercial standards, and require that the supplier provide an objective
factual basis for its insecurity, such as the debtor’s failure to satisfy past
due accounts. In instances where the supplier has reason to believe that the
customer is in financial distress but not yet declared bankrupt, the supplier
can unilaterally impose terms of cash-in-advance or cash-on-delivery as
explicitly authorized under U.C.C. §2-702(1).
Timing is critical in attempting to benefit from an adequate assurance
claim. Once a debtor is granted a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor
typically demands that a supplier continue to perform on an underlying
contract. The debtor will file a motion to enforce the automatic stay and
the terms and conditions of the existing contract even though it offers no
post-petition payment to suppliers or modifications to the contract that are
objectionable to the supplier.266
VII. THE CURRENT REALITY AND UNSETTLED ISSUES
The recession of 2007-2009 and the lingering post-recessionary
effects have tested the corporate bankruptcy process. In particular, there
was scrutiny of the safeguards designed to prevent suppliers from bearing
an unfair financial burden from their contractual agreements with
financially distressed corporate customers. The BAPCPA of 2005 was
intended to enhance traditional protections and remedies for suppliers.
However, after several years of litigation, the conclusion may be drawn that
264. See Daniel N. Sharkey, The “Car Wars” in Court: Steel, Plastics, Terms, and Other Fronts in
Automotive Supply Litigation, Mich. B. J., Dec. 2008, http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/ pdf4article
1450.pdf (discussing litigation of automotive suppliers).
265. Patrick Mears, Long Term Supply Contracts In Auto Supplier Bankruptcies, AUTOMOBILE
BANKR. RESOURCES, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/bankruptcylaw/blogs/
bankruptcycommentary/archive/2009/09/15/long-term-supply-contracts-in-auto-supplier-bankruptcies.a
spx.
266. In many bankruptcy cases, the debtor will reject the demands of suppliers for cash on delivery
or cash in advance. In In re Visteon Corp., 2010 WL 1416796 (Bankr. D. Del.), Visteon sent a letter
notifying its suppliers that an automatic stay had been imposed to prevent third parties from taking
actions against its assets without prior approval of the Bankruptcy Court, under § 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Therefore, Visteon reasoned that the supplier’s demands, which in the debtor’s view represented
noncourt approved, unilaterally demands, would violate the automatic stay.
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the provisions have failed to deliver on their promise. The general
provisions of section 503(b)(9) and section 546(c) are now swallowed by
exceptions, which complicates suppliers’ understanding of their rights
when a debtor files for bankruptcy and provide significant obstacles to
recovery of either payment or goods sold.
Even with the enactment of section 546(c), which substantially
extended the time for reclamation claims, suppliers continue to encounter
the same pre-BAPCPA obstacles to relief267 as evidenced by court holdings
in the AMS, Dana, and Incredible Auto Sales. By the time the reclamation
demand is made, most of the debtor’s asset-based financing has a
prioritized lien on the goods the supplier is attempting to reclaim. Thus, if
the value of a reclaiming a supplier’s goods does not exceed the amount of
debt secured by the prior lien, the supplier’s reclamation claim is
valueless.268 Further, by the time of reclamation demand, the goods sold by
the supplier may become commingled with debtors finished product or
resold, which again makes reclamation moot. As a result, the suppliers’
efforts to reclaim goods under section 546(c) rarely produce any beneficial
results.269
Although section 503(b)(9) attempts to improve the supplier’s position
pertaining to goods sold to the debtor within the twenty days prebankruptcy, the actual benefit to be derived by the supplier is at best
illusory.270 In reality, if the supplier is unable to obtain an immediate
payment of a section 503(b)(9) claim and the case is thereafter rendered
administratively insolvent, the supplier is unlikely to ever receive money
on its claim.271 A section 503(b)(9) claim does not give an immediate right
to payment and the scheduling remains in the discretion of the bankruptcy
court. If the value of the bankruptcy estate is less than the value of the filed
administrative claims, the supplier and other creditors must agree how their
respective individual claims will be paid. Notwithstanding providing new
remedies for suppliers that deliver goods to the debtor within a twenty-day
prepetition period, the BAPCPA fails to provide adequate remedies for
businesses that provide services.
Despite the new BAPCPA provisions, the questions of how a supplier
may reclaim the goods sold or receive full payment on its goods sold to a

267. Nathan, supra note 130, at 22–25.
268. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 409, 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
269. Jack F. Williams, Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?
JUDICIARYHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 11, 2009), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Williams090311.pdf.
270. Miller & Welford, supra note 139, at 494.
271. Id.
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customer who thereafter filed for bankruptcy remain unanswered.
Additional uncertainty in the law still exists272 as supplier advocates believe
that the Phar-Mor decision reopened the possibility of viable reclamation
claims273 and the language of section503(b)(9) administrative claims
continues to be interpreted differently by the courts.274 It is unlikely that
the drafters of BAPCPA envisioned the various ancillary issues that would
arise from their new legislation and its ineffectiveness to address
previously existing issues pertaining to suppliers. Thus, unless the
BAPCPA’s provisions are amended or uncertainty is greatly reduced in
supplier bankruptcy practices, the goal of providing greater protection for
suppliers will remain unaccomplished.

272. Muazzin Mehrban, Proposals to Repeal Certain Provisions of BAPCPA,
FINANCIERWORLDWIDE.COM. (Feb. 2010), http://www.financierworldwide.com/article.php?id=5921&
page=2 (stating that “BAPCPA is the most complicated overhaul of the bankruptcy code for several
decades, and despite it being four years since its implementation, certain areas of the law remain hazy”).
273. Wanda Borges, Hot Issues in Bankruptcy in Today’s Economic Climate, NAT’L. ASS’N. OF
CREDIT MGMT., 2009 (noting that “[i]nterestingly, despite the ruling in the Dana case, a subsequent
ruling may have reopened the possibility of viable reclamation claims. Long dormant, the 6th Circuit
Court of Appeals rendered its decision in the Phar-Mor, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. case in 2008. The
Sixth Circuit found that properly reclaimed goods remain the seller’s property and never become the
debtor’s property, thus, in this way a secured creditor’s claim cannot attach to the properly reclaimed
goods.”).
274. William J. Burnett & Colleen A. Garrity, Two New Judges, Two New Opinions: Too Bad for
503(b)(9) Suppliers, ABIWORLD.NET, (Mar. 2007), http://abiworld.net/newsletter/utc/vol5num1/Two
NewOpinions.html.

